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A Twice-Told Tale:
Plausibility and Narrative Coherence
in Judicial Storytelling
J. Christopher Rideout*
"[T]he plausibility of stories has little to do with ... their actual truth
status . . . . -Bernard Jackson'
"To be human is to seek coherence... " -Steven Winter 2
"Who do you believe, me or your own eyes?" -Justice Stephen Breyer
(paraphrasing Chico Marx)3
Introduction
In Scott v. Harris,4 an opinion issued by the United States Supreme
Court in 2007, the Court offers a tale told twice. In one version of the tale,
eight members of the Court agree that the case involves a story of "a
Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort."5 In this telling, the
chase, by police of a reckless speeder, so endangers public safety as to
justify the use of deadly force to bring the chase to an end. A ninth
member of the Court dissents to tell the tale differently, however, and in
doing so agrees with the telling by the lower Court of Appeals.6 In his
* @ J. Christopher Rideout 2013. Professor of Lawyering Skills and Associate Director of Legal Writing, Seattle University
School of Law. Portions of this article were first presented at the 2009 Applied Legal Storytelling Conference held at Lewis
and Clark Law School and, in 2012, to the University of Denver law faculty. The author wishes to thank those who made
comments at those two presentations and, in addition, to thank Marilyn Walter and Sara Benson for their helpful comments
on the manuscript of this article.
1 Bernard S. Jackson, Law, Fact, and Narrative Coherence 63 (1988).
2 Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agony Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 Mich. L. Rev.
2225,2230(1989).
3 Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, and Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils
of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 837, 840 (2009).
4 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
5 Id. at 380.
6 Id. at 389.
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dissent Justice Stevens vehemently disagrees with the majority, describing
the case instead as a story about a motorist fleeing a needless police
pursuit, at high speeds but in an orderly manner.7 Justice Stevens sees-
and tells-the story so differently that he must protest, "This is hardly the
stuff of Hollywood.'8
Legally, the case involves questions about the use of deadly force and
qualified immunity.9 But more broadly, the case also offers insights into
story construction and the relative plausibility of the multiple, competing
narratives that can emerge in court.10 In Scott, where even the judges
disagree about what the facts reveal, different members of the court have
to construct their respective versions of the story. This story construction
is common at the trial level, where the trial judge must construct the
court's story out of the competing stories offered during trial,,1 but it is
more unusual at the level of the Supreme Court. Or, at least, it is unusual
to see the Court so openly and visibly disagree about story structures.
Scott contains an additional twist in that a videotape exists of the car
chase, thus enabling the respective members of the Court to 'see for
[themselves.]"12 They did just that, interpreting the facts, framing those
interpretations narratively, and telling their stories of what happened.
Justice Scalia told the story for the majority.
For him and seven of his fellow justices, the story-as constructed
from their viewing of the videotape-is self-evident, and the alternate
story told by the Court of Appeals and Justice Stevens is "blatantly contra-
dicted by the record."' 3 Justice Scalia writes, "Respondent's version of
events is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could
have believed him. The Court of Appeals should not have relied on such
visible fiction; it should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the
videotape" 14 Justice Breyer, concurring, regards the story as equally self-
evident, commenting that "[b]ecause watching the video footage of the car
chase made a difference to my own view of the case, I suggest that the
interested reader take advantage of the link in the Court's opinion ... and
watch it."I Justices Scalia and Breyer both confidently refer to the
videotape as bolstering their version of the story, without the need even
7 Id. at 390-94. mecourt.gov/media/media.aspx; select Scott v. Harris-
8 Id. at 392. VIDEO (April 30, 2007). At the time of this writing, it is
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IdZn4Lvs
9 Kahan, supra n. 3, at 845. LHQ(accessed March 4, 2013).
10 See e.g. Robert P. Burns, A Theory ofthe Trial 164 (1999). 13 550 U.S. at 380.
11 James Boyd White, Heracles' Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric 14 Id. at 380-81.
and Poetics of the Law 174 (1985).
15 Id. at 387.
12 Kahan, supra n. 3, at 843. The Court originally posted the
videotape on its web page, available at http://www.supre-
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for much elaboration. The facts, entered into the record in the form of a
videotape, tell the story in and of themselves.
Or do they? The story told by Justice Stevens may belong to a
minority of one on the Supreme Court, but it matches the story
constructed by the lower appellate court. Were the facts so self-evident,
they would not have resulted in two versions of the tale. Indeed, the facts
in a legal contest are seldom self-evident, for they are viewed not in a
vacuum, but rather within interpretive frameworks. Those interpretive
frameworks, in turn, provide opportunities to build a story that coheres
and is plausible. Facts become meaningful within a story structure, a
structure that guides their interpretation. As Bennett and Feldman wrote
some years ago, "the structure of stories becomes crucial to judgment in
cases in which a collection of facts or evidence is subject to competing
interpretations. In such cases, it may not be the evidence that sways final
judgment; judgment hinges on the structure of interpretation that
provides the best fit for the evidence.'1 6 That interpretive structure, they
suggest, is narrative.
In Scott, Justice Stevens and the lower court told a different tale from
the majority because, viewing the same set of facts as presented in the
videotape, he and they employed a somewhat different interpretive
framework, one that, in turn, resulted in their constructing a different
narrative. The meaning of events depends not on the raw facts, but rather
on the interpretive framework and the accompanying narrative into which
they can be plausibly fit. And to be plausible, that narrative must be
coherent.
During the oral arguments in Scott v. Harris, several justices ques-
tioned the lawyer for the respondent about the story he relies on. They
challenged both his version of events and the version presented by the
lower court, and they also confronted those versions with what these
justices had seen in the videotape.17 At one point Justice Breyer, apparently
with some exasperation, remarked, "I look at the tape and I end up with
Chico Marx's old question with respect to the Court of Appeals: 'Who do
you believe, me or your own eyes?' 18 Chico's question is apt, but the
question of belief goes deeper than the eyes. The question of whom you
believe, of whose version of the story is more plausible, also depends in
part on the underlying narrative framework that you use, one that is inti-
16 W. Lance Bennett & Martha S. Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom: Justice and Judgment in American
Culture 89-90 (1981).
17 See Kahan, supra n. 3, at 839-40.
18 Transcr., Scott v. Harris, 2007 WL 601927 at '54 (Feb. 26, 2007) (127 S. Ct. 468 (2007)).
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mately involved with the story you then tell. As I hope to show below, a
key factor in the plausibility of the underlying narrative is its coherence.
I. Narrative Structures and Plausibility
In an earlier article, I used the question, "what is it about narratives
that makes them persuasive in the law?""9 as a way of addressing both the
narrative frameworks that underlie legal arguments and the dynamics of
those frameworks. In the course of examining that question, I also stepped
back to look at the broader prior question-what role do narratives play in
persuasion generally? The answer, I argued, is that models for argumen-
tation and persuasion are incomplete unless they account for the role of
narrative, and of "narrative rationality."20 The term narrative rationality is
one I adopted from the speech communications theorist Walter Fisher,
who proposed the term and who himself claimed that models of argumen-
tation that derive from "logical" models only-whether formal or
informal-were incomplete. 2 1 Persuasion depends not only on logical
structures, but also on narrative structures. Fisher further categorized
narrative rationality into "narrative fidelity" and "narrative probability," or
what could be called respectively the thematic and the structural prop-
erties of narrative. 22 In that earlier article, I focused on the first, narrative
fidelity-a category that Fisher described as "substantive" (thematic), in
contrast with narrative probability, which he described as "formal"
(structural).23 Narrative fidelity is the property that makes a narrative "ring
true;' that thematically matches a narrative to what we aspire to in our
lives.24 It is also an important part of how individual narratives contribute
to what could be called our cultural narrative.
19 J. Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion, 14 Leg. Writing 53, 55 (2008).
20 Id. at 56-57.
21 Walter R. Fisher, Human Communication as Narrative: Toward a Philosophy ofReason, Value, and Action 47-48 (1989).
22 See Rideout, supra n. 19, at 63. Jackson similarly offers "thematic" and "structural" as the two categories, or levels, at which
narratives construct meaning, his thematic level corresponding to Fisher's category of narrative fidelity and his structural
level corresponding to Fisher's category of narrative probability. Jackson adds a third level, the socio-linguistic level, which he
describes as belonging to the "surface" level of the text (as opposed to the other two, which belong to the "deep" level). See
Jackson, supra n. 1, at 79.
23 Rideout, supra n. 19, at 69.
24 Fisher, supra n. 21, at 64. Fisher's discussion of the concept reaches beyond social psychology into rhetoric and, more
specifically, Chaim Perelman's notion of audience adherence. Thus, Fisher's notion of "narrative fidelity" offers an audience-
based approach to what could be called correspondence theories of truth, as opposed to coherence theories of truth. Fisher,
however, would substitute "good reasons" for the word "truth" in the notion of correspondence theory. See Rideout, supra n.
19, at 69-70. For a more extended discussion of the contrast between correspondence and coherence theories of truth, see
Jackson, supra n. 1, at 37-60, 84-88.
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In this article, I want to focus on narrative probability, the overriding
formal, or structural, feature of narrative rationality. Narrative probability
is the feature of narratives that lends them much of their plausibility, that
makes them structurally convincing. In the way in which Fisher uses the
term, a good synonym for narrative probability would be "narrative
coherence:' and that is the term that I will use for the rest of this article. 25
Narrative coherence can be a powerful component of legal persuasion,
strong enough to increase the likelihood that a judge or jury will accept
one party's underlying story, independent of the quality of the evidence
presented as information or facts.26 Those facts become persuasive when
woven coherently into a story.
The discussion below further breaks down narrative coherence into
two parts, external coherence and internal coherence.27 Both forms of
narrative coherence are, essentially, a matter of unity and connection,28 a
matter of creating a sense that the narrative presents an action that is
complete both in its larger meaning and in its parts. External coherence
refers to the match of a specific given narrative with other stories that exist
in the "stock of social knowledge" 29 and that lend meaning to that specific
narrative, providing it with broader cultural content.30 External coherence
is thus a matter of the story's connection, but not connection with an
external social reality-a literal reality check. Rather, external coherence is
a matter of the story's structural connection to other culturally based
stories that we use to make sense of social reality.3 1 Internal coherence
refers to the parts of the narrative and a sense that they fit with each
other-that they are consistent and that they form a complete "sequential
arrangement."32
Both forms of narrative coherence, external and internal, contribute
to a story's plausibility, to its "making sense" They do so not because the
story necessarily corresponds in a direct way to "what really happened;'
25 In the earlier article, I stayed with Fisher's term but noted its synonymity with "coherence." See Rideout, supra n. 19, at 64.
In discussing the formal property of narratives-narrative probability-Fisher also notes that "[iun epistemological terms, the
question would be whether or not a narrative satisfied the demands of a coherence theory of truth.' Fisher, supra n. 21, at
75-76.
26 See Richard Lempert, Telling Tales in Court: Trial Procedure and the Story Model, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 559, 562 (1991).
27 As noted above, I discuss these two terms in the earlier article under the general heading of "narrative probability"
(following Fisher), breaking them down into Fisher's slightly different terminology of "coherence" (internal coherence) and
"correspondence" (external coherence). See Rideout, supra n. 19, at 63-67.
28 See Jonathan Yovel, Running Backs, Wolves, and Other Fatalities, 16 L. & Lit. 127, 129 (2004).
29 Jackson, supra n. 1, at 59.
30 Yovel, supra n. 28, at 131.
31 Rideout, supra n. 19, at 67; Yovel, supra n. 29, at 131.
32 Yovel, supra n. 28, at 130-31.
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but rather because the story seems whole, complete, and consistent in its
meaning. This is why narrative coherence is a structural matter.
A. Narrative coherence: external correspondence
and thematic framing
As mentioned above, external coherence is a matter of how well a
narrative corresponds structurally with background social knowledge, and
with cultural presuppositions that lend the narrative meaning-with what
"typically" happens in the world."3 External coherence is sufficiently
important to the plausibility of the narrative that Burns terms it "external
factual plausibility," a sense that the story "could .. . have happened that
way."34 Once the events of a trial are framed within an underlying
narrative, that narrative-through the social background and cultural
expectations that attach to it-provides a framework with which the
events of the trial can cohere. Jackson notes that "[a] story will appear
plausible to the extent that it manifests similarity with some model of
narrative which exists within the stock of social knowledge .... 5
Importantly, this framework is not only structural, but also
thematic. 36 In cohering externally with shared social and cultural
knowledge, that shared knowledge lends meaning to the narrative. The
key to external coherence lies in understanding that its thematic
framework derives not from the content of the narrative as an empirical
description of social reality, but rather from the social and cultural presup-
positions that it conjures and with which it coheres, structurally. Burns, in
summarizing how narrative works in a trial, notes that this thematic
framework is unavoidable: "The story told ... inevitably assigns a meaning
to the human action ... ."7 The thematic framework is a powerful part of
the coherence-and hence the plausibility-of narrative because, as a
given narrative links to our shared expectations, that narrative is also
contextualized in a way that guides its meaning.
This contextualization is often discussed by narrative scholars in
terms of "narrative scripts," or "stock stories."38 A narrative script is a
cognitive structure that offers, in story form, a standard model for human
33 Rideout, supra n. 19, at 66. Remember that thematic, as opposed to structural, correspondence is a matter of narrative
fidelity.
34 Burns, supra n. 10, at 168; Jackson calls it "external narrative coherence," supra n. 1, at 58-59.
35 Jackson, supra n. 1, at 59.
36 Again, external coherence overall functions structurally, eliciting a thematic framework through its structural corre-
spondence. See Rideout, supra n. 20, at 67, 69-70.
37 Burns, supra n. 10, at 163 (emphasis added).
38 See Rideout, supra n. 20, at 67-68; see also Anthony G. Amsterdam & Jerome Bruner, Minding the Law, 45-48, 121-22,
186-87 (2000); Brian J. Foley & Ruth Anne Robbins, Fiction 101: A Primer for Lawyers on How to Use Fiction Writing
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action.39 When we encounter a story-or a telling of events-we frame
that telling within a scripted narrative arc, one that establishes a certain
set of relationships between the events. 40 Sherwin calls the narrative script
the "latent" story, as opposed to the surface ordering of events (the
"manifest,' or "surface" story).41 Because narrative scripts, or latent stories,
are culturally based, they also allow for generalizations about the meaning
of the relationships between eventS42-hence, the thematic framework
that inevitably accompanies a narrative script.
When my wife and I were travelling abroad recently, we encountered
two police officers and a group of young adults in the center of a southern
French city. The youths, like us, did not seem to be fluent in spoken
French, so the communication between them and the police was strained,
with hand gestures and quizzical looks. Before long, the police drove off
with one of the youths. My wife, a charitable person, wondered if that
youth had been lost and needed help getting to a bus or train station. I
countered that he may have been a pickpocket. We put the events into
differing narrative scripts, accompanied by very different thematic
frameworks. 43 Both of our stories, different as they were, however, were
plausible by virtue of their external coherence.
Narrative scripts and their thematic frameworks in turn rely upon
even deeper cognitive structures, usually referred to generally as
schemata.44 As Winter points out, we construct meaning "from the
ground up;' deriving the meaning of a narrative from the underlying
schemata. 45 Sherwin points out that these schemata, in turn, help to fill in
the meaning of our narrative scripts.46 This "filling in" is an important part
of the interpretive role of narrative scripts and their thematic frameworks.
Techniques to Write Persuasive Facts Sections, 32 Rutgers L.J. 459 (2001); Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 1
(1984); Ruth Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and Merlin: Telling the Client's Story Using the Characters and
Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero's Journey, 29 Seattle U. L. Rev. 767, 773-78 (2006).
39 Rideout, supra n. 19, at 68. The classic article on the cognitive function of scripts in general is Roger C. Schank & Robert
P. Abelson, Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding: An Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures 42-46 (1977); see also
Bennett & Feldman, supra n. 16, at 53.
40 Linda L. Berger, The Lady or the Tiger?A Field Guide to Metaphor and Narrative, 50 Washburn L.J. 275, 278 (2011).
41 Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction ofLegal Reality, 6 J. ALWD 88, 106 (2009).
42 Rideout, supra n. 19, at 68. Berger notes that they carry with them values, beliefs, and ideologies, Berger, supra n. 40, at
278.
43 1 would like to think that I, too, am a charitable person, but I had also read in our travel guide to beware of foreign youths
in this city who commonly picked pockets. Because both my wife and I were foreigners-that is, cultural outsiders-we were
to some extent choosing, or constructing, our respective stories of what we had seen.
44 For an early article on narratives and their underlying schemata, see Winter, supra n. 2, at 2230-41; see also Sherwin, supra
n. 41, at. 104-06, and Berger, supra n. 40, at 277-78, 280-83.
45 Winter, supra n. 2, at 2230-31.
46 Sherwin, supra n. 41, at 106.
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Although I will not attempt to explicitly trace it back here, my pick-
pocketing script-prompted by a travel guide-was no doubt partly filled
in by meaning-making schemata associated with "police;' "groups of
youths;' and "foreigners/outsiders." And had the events, characters, and
setting that I witnessed not been coherent with this narrative script and its
underlying schemata, I would have had to choose a different narrative
script, one with a different thematic framework.
Bennett and Feldman also see the filling in as a key step in the
construction of narrative meaning. Initially, they note, the events of the
trial must be located within the central action of a story, a narrative
script.47 But once that takes place, the narrative script supplies "inferences
about the relationships among the surrounding elements in the story that
impinge on the central action."48 These inferences make the events of the
trial externally coherent by linking them to a thematic frame. Berger also
notes how inferences contribute to the interpretive power of the narrative
script: "[I]f the story you are telling is one that already is embedded in
tradition and culture, you need not fill in all the details; you can simply
name the characters, and the plot will spring to life in the listener's
mind."49
External coherence, then, relies on a narrative script with a central
action, on inferences made possible by that script-including inferences
that can fill in some of the gaps, and on a thematic framework that lends
meaning to it all. And just as the interpretive function of the thematic
framework is important to the connections and inferences that constitute
external coherence, so does the thematic frame set the stage for internal
coherence as well.
B. Narrative coherence: internal consistency
The second form narrative coherence takes is that of internal
coherence. Most theorists who write about narrative structures in the law
define internal coherence in the same way: as a matter of internal
consistency. Pennington and Hastie note that a story has internal
coherence when it lacks "internal contradictions' 50 Jackson writes that
"[i]nternal narrative coherence can be conceived primarily in quasi-logical
terms. Are the various parts of the story consistent with one another, or do
they manifest contradiction?"' Bennett and Feldman cite internal
47 Bennett & Feldman, supra n. 16, at 41.
48 Id.
49 Berger, supra n. 40, at 278.
50 Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory ofJuror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 519,
528 (1991).
51 Jackson, supra n. 1, at 58.
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consistency as one of the features that lend stories their interpretive value,
further explaining that the various inferences that accompany any
narrative understanding must be "mutually compatible."'52
Bennett and Feldman also tie the importance of internal consistency
to plot, to "the central action in a story."53 Yovel agrees, pointing out that
internal coherence relies on "culturally-entrenched notions of sequen-
tiality, causation, and action:' highlighting in particular the internal
sequentiality of the narrative.54 When we think of a set of events as a story,
as something more than just a collection of discrete actions, then internal
narrative coherence is a part of our thinking. The actions must fit together
in a sequential arrangement that accords with our sense of causation and
that is internally consistent.
At the level of the text, the consistency of the actions manifests itself
through the identifiable parts of the narrative. As noted above, first the
actions must connect together to form a plot. Although the usage of the
term "plot" has become somewhat ambiguous in the narratology
literature, I am using it here to mean a chain of "causally connected events
in a story."ss The key phrase in terms of internal coherence is "causally
connected";s 6 to be internally consistent, the events must bear a rela-
tionship to one another, not just be adjacent to each other or be randomly
ordered. That relationship, for our purposes, depends on sequence and
causation.s" Sequence implies an ordering to events, so that they are
connected in a meaningful way, not just randomly.s8 Sequence also relies
upon causation. In a famous example, "the king died and then the queen
died of grief:" the sequence invokes causation (the queen's grief at the
king's death). 9 Even if the causation is not spelled out, we assume it from
the sequence. Thus, even in the version without explicit causation, "the
king died and soon after the queen died:' we still typically assume that the
52 Bennett & Feldman, supra n. 16, at 41. Although they do not use the term "internal coherence," Bennett and Feldman
essentially describe it as the third key element of narrative structures and their interpretive function-after the steps
mentioned above-of identifying the central action and then drawing inferences from those actions. See id.
53 Id.
54 Yovel, supra n. 28, at 131.
55 H. Porter Abbott, The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative 194 (2002) (emphasis omitted). I use this definition of plot as
opposed to a simple synonym for "story," or to a collection of events not necessarily connected, or to a collection of events
that is only episodically connected. See id. at 16-17. (2002).
56 Id. at 194.
57 Yovel, supra n. 28, at 131.
58 Because sequence is a meaning-making ordering of events, we can and do, for example, tell stories that are out of chrono-
logical order, so as to make a different kind of meaning with our choice of sequencing. See Mieke Bal, Narratology:
Introduction to the Theory ofNarrative 80-82 (1997).
59 E.M. Forster, Aspects of the Novel 130 (1954).
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queen's death has something to do with the king's death. Our minds look
for the consistency and connection that characterize internal coherence.60
Next to plot, a second key aspect of any narrative structure is
character.61 Character is often seen as the counterpart to plot. Henry
James famously noted the interdependence: "What is character but the
determination of incident? What is incident but the illustration of
character?" 62 James made this link because characters have agency and,
thus, cause things to happen.63 Agency translates motive into action. To be
internally coherent, this translation must be consistent: from character,
through motive, to action, to plot.
Internal coherence requires consistency among other aspects of a
narrative as well, for example setting and point of view. The details of
some of these aspects, such as setting, are often partially inferred, or filled
in, through the scripting function of the underlying narrative structure.
This brings us back to the thematic framework of the narrative structure,
mentioned above. 64 The thematic framework itself may be external to the
internal sequentiality of the narrative, but it serves not only to structure
the internal actions, but also to allow for consistency among the elements
of plot, character, setting, etc. The thematic framework, in a sense,
provides an overriding organizing principle for the internal elements of
the narrative, and their consistency relies in part on their connection to it.
Once I scripted my European encounter as a pickpocketing narrative, the
actions of the police (apprehension and arrest) were consistent with the
action of the youth (acquiescence). The characters were also consistent
with this thematic framework (the police were not apprehending
American tourists like me, who may have been equally lost). And the
setting was consistent as well (the inner, walled area of the city, pointed
out by my travel guide as an habitud for pickpockets).
In my own view, one other aspect remains especially for legal story-
telling-the highlighting of key pieces of evidence. Legal storytelling, after
all, is not imagined fiction, but rather is constructed from the evidence
presented at trial. A fiction writer has the luxury of inventing elements of
the story and so can ensure that those elements are mutually consistent
and complete. The storytelling done at trial falls well short of this imagi-
native freedom, however, and thus in some ways makes the task of telling
60 See Seymour Chatman, Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film 45-46 (1978).
61 Berger mentions character and plot as key aspects of the "argument-shaping" function of storytelling. See Berger, supra n.
42, at 278.
62 Abbott, supra n. 55, 124 n. 3 (quoting Henry James, The Art ofFiction, in The Future ofthe Novel 15-16 (1956)).
63 Id. at 124.
64 See nn. 34-50 and accompanying text, supra.
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a coherent story more difficult. I mentioned earlier that the task of being
externally coherent in part relies on the "filling in" function of inferences,
between the evidence and the thematic framework of the narrative script.
For internal coherence, there is a counterpart: the highlighting of key
pieces of evidence, not inferred but rather presented or even emphasized,
that serve to link together other pieces of evidence into a narrative whose
parts are mutually consistent and complete-that is, internally coherent.
These key linking pieces of evidence are central to the plausibility of the
story. And when they are highlighted strategically, they can even reinforce
the inferences drawn about other pieces of the story that have not been
presented as evidence.
II. Narrative Coherence in Scott v. Harris
As I mentioned at the beginning of this article, the Court in Scott v.
Harris told two very different tales, each tale derived from the same set of
facts and each tale equally plausible to those who adhered to it. This is
simply a way of saying that different members of the Court placed the facts
into different narrative structures. Once they did so, however, those
narratives provided powerful interpretive frameworks for the way in
which respective members of the Court understood the case-so powerful
that neither side of the Court could see how the record would in any way
support the other side's version of events. The opposing side's version of
events was simply not plausible, even though for its adherents it was the
only plausible story. Both sides agreed that the central action of the tale is
that of a car chase, but in framing that chase within such different
narrative structures, their stories lead to very different conclusions. The
difference between the two sides-and the two stories-is, as I hope to
show now, in part a difference in the way in which their stories achieved
coherence.
I have already laid out above a structure for looking at narrative
coherence. Externally, it works by means of a narrative script; the thematic
framework underlying that script; and the inferences that the script
allows. Internally, it works through a consistency among key parts of the
story-the initiating causation, the action, the characters, and the
setting-with the additional highlighting of key pieces of evidence.
Before I turn to analyzing the coherence of these two versions of the
tale, it seems only fair that I let you know more fully what actually
happened in the case. By now, however, you must appreciate my hesi-
tation-my reluctance to engage in the seemingly impossible task of giving
you the "actual" account of events. Fortunately, a trio of scholars has
77
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already attempted that task, fully aware of the controversy surrounding
the telling of different tales in this case. 65 I offer their version of the tale
and let it stand on its own.
Just before 11:00 p.m. on March 29, 2001, on a two-lane highway in
the Atlanta suburbs, the police detected Victor Harris speeding. But
when the officers attempted to make a traffic stop, Harris hit the gas
pedal, fleeing at high speed. Soon a car driven by Officer Timothy Scott
joined the chase. Knowing little of the inciting situation, Scott had
decided on his own initiative to help apprehend Harris. Following a slow-
speed interlude that included a side swiping in an empty shopping mall
parking lot, the chase returned to the road, reaching speeds in excess of
eighty-five miles per hour. The pursuit ended some six minutes and nine
miles after it began, when Scott decided to strike Harris's rear bumper
with his car, causing Harris, as intended, to spin out of control and crash.
Scott recognized that this maneuver involved a significant risk of serious
injury or death to Harris, who in fact suffered a broken neck that left him
a quadriplegic. 66
Now to the Court's tellings of the tale.
A. "A Hollywood-style car chase": the tale told by the majority
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia describes the facts in Scott as "a
Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort"6 7 In doing so, he
lays out a powerful narrative script in a mere ten words. He identifies the
central action as a car chase, but one that is reckless, out of control, and
dangerous. The thematic framework of this script is clear: the chase goes
beyond the boundaries of an ordinary car chase ("Hollywood-style" and
"frightening"), and it puts other members of the public at risk. And the
chief protagonist-the primary agent in this tale of recklessness and
danger-is Victor Harris, the driver of the car that the police are pursuing.
Scalia introduces his version in two paragraphs, as a chronology.
68
Within this chronology, the central action of the car chase is scripted as a
police pursuit of a speeding vehicle. 69 Police pursuit becomes an
important part of his narrative script, drawing upon a story that is
repeated on television shows and in movies regularly. In this script, there
are bad guys and good guys-the fleeing lawbreaker and the police trying
to stop him (or her). We are presented, then, not only with a chronology,
65 See Kahan, supra n. 3, at 842-43. 68 Id. at 374-75.
66 Id. at 843-44. 69 Id.
67 550 U.S. at 380.
78
A TWICE-TOLD TALE
but also a narrative script and a strong thematic framework to which the
facts can externally cohere.70
In March 2001, a Georgia county deputy clocked respondent's
vehicle traveling at 73 miles per hour on a road with a 55-mile-per-hour
speed limit. The deputy activated his blue flashing lights indicating that
respondent should pull over. Instead, respondent sped away, initiating a
chase down what is in most portions a two-lane road, at speeds
exceeding 85 miles per hour. The deputy radioed his dispatch to report
that he was pursuing a fleeing vehicle, and broadcast its license plate
number. Petitioner, Deputy Timothy Scott, heard the radio communi-
cation and joined the pursuit along with other officers. In the midst of
the chase, respondent pulled into the parking lot of a shopping center
and was nearly boxed in by the various police vehicles. Respondent
evaded the trap by making a sharp turn, colliding with Scott's police car,
exiting the parking lot, and speeding off once again down a two-lane
highway.
Following respondent's shopping center maneuvering, which
resulted in slight damage to Scott's police car, Scott took over as the lead
pursuit vehicle. Six minutes and nearly 10 miles after the chase had
begun, Scott decided to attempt to terminate the episode by employing a
"Precision Intervention Technique ('PIT') maneuver, which causes the
fleeing vehicle to spin to a stop." Having radioed his supervisor for
permission, Scott was told to "'[g]o ahead and take him out."' Instead,
Scott applied his push bumper to the rear of respondent's vehicle. As a
result, respondent lost control of his vehicle, which left the roadway, ran
down an embankment, overturned, and crashed. Respondent was badly
injured and was rendered a quadriplegic. 71
Within this seemingly chronological account, the story begins with
the respondent, Mr. Harris, speeding and then, in response to an officer's
effort to pull him over, "initiating a chase."72 In Scalia's telling, then, the
initiating cause of the story is the respondent, choosing to flee a police
officer and to drive recklessly and at inordinately high speeds. The
respondent's actions embody this recklessness: he "sped away," "pulled into
the parking lot:' but "evaded the trap.73 His evasion involved "making a
sharp turn, colliding with Scott's police car, exiting the parking lot, and
speeding off once again down a two-lane highway."74 Even after his car is
struck from the rear by Officer Scott, the respondent remains the one
70 I do not mean to imply here that Justice Scalia is delib- 71 Id. at 374-75.
erately manipulating the facts in order to tell a distorted 72 Id. at 374.
story, but rather that he is telling the story in terms of a
narrative script that he has already formed in his own mind 73 Id. at 374-75.
about what happened in the case. 74 Id. at 375.
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responsible: "[R]espondent lost control of his vehicle." 5 The facts, as
written, do not say that Officer Scott pushed the respondent off the road
or knocked him out of control. The telling achieves internal consistency
through the actions of the respondent, and those actions are also
consistent with his role as the agent of the initiating cause.
In contrast, the actions of the police officers are more benign, but
again internally consistent in that benignity. The first officer "clocked" the
respondent's car, "activated" his flashing lights, and "radioed" a report of
what he was doing. 76 These actions sound routine. Officer Scott's actions
sound equally routine: he "heard the radio communication;' "joined the
pursuit;' and "took over as the lead pursuit vehicle."77 His real actions are
buried inside the less dramatic word "pursuit:' not spelled out for the
reader. After he "decided to attempt to terminate the episode" (a highly
abstract account of the action), he "applied his push bumper"-again, the
real action buried in the relatively actionless verb, "applied' 78 As
mentioned above, the respondent is the one who "lost control." Nowhere
in these two paragraphs are the officers speeding or colliding; the closest
they come to engaging in any equally dangerous actions is in the verb
phrase "pursuing a fleeing vehicle:' but in that phrase "pursuing" is again
reasortably benign.79
This account of the officers' actions, routine and abstract as it sounds,
is not only internally consistent but also coheres with one of the larger
implications of the narrative script: that the officers are simply doing their
job. Furthermore, that narrative script allows other inferences, not wholly
spelled out-or without requiring that they even be spelled out: for
example, that the respondent was a lawbreaker who deserved appre-
hension; that the police, who had chosen to pursue the respondent at high
speeds, did not bear responsibility for the chase; and that the chase had to
come to an end for the sake of public safety.
Shortly after this account, Justice Scalia acknowledges that the Court
of Appeals told a very different version of the story, but he attempts to
dismiss it as following a laughably unsuitable narrative script: "[R]eading
the lower court's opinion, one gets the impression that respondent, rather
than fleeing from police, was attempting to pass his driving test.'80 He then
turns to the videotape for key pieces of evidence that would bolster his
own version.
75 Id. 78 Id.
76 Id. 79 Id.
77 Id. 80 Id. at 378-79.
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The videotape tells quite a different story. There we see
respondent's vehicle racing down narrow, two-lane roads in the dead of
night at speeds that are shockingly fast. We see it swerve around more
than a dozen other cars, cross the double-yellow line, and force cars
traveling in both directions to their respective shoulders to avoid being
hit. We see it run multiple red lights and travel for considerable periods
of time in the occasional center left-turn-only lane, chased by numerous
police cars forced to engage in the same hazardous maneuvers just to
keep up.81
The videotape, of course, only "tells" this story in the context of Justice
Scalia's interpretive frame. And the key pieces of evidence that he high-
lights are consistent with his own narrative script, but may or may not be
consistent with what actually happened. 82 The agent this time-in the
"telling" of the videotape-is the respondent's car (a figurative extension of
the respondent), which races at "shockingly fast" speeds," swerves,
crosses the center line, forces other cars to the shoulder, and runs lights.
Again, the actions are internally consistent with the actions of a dangerous
and reckless vehicle. The setting further supports this: "narrow, two-lane
roads in the dead of night'8 In case the reader wonders about the agency
of the pursuing officers in this action, he states that they are 'forced to
engage in the same hazardous maneuvers just to keep up" (emphasis
added)."'
I mentioned earlier that one challenge in constructing a legal story
from pieces of evidence is that the legal storyteller lacks the imaginative
freedom that a fiction writer would have. This challenge also includes
dealing with pieces of evidence that do not quite fit the narrative script.
Scalia indeed must do this, although he chooses to do so in a footnote:
"This is not to say that each and every factual statement made by the
Court of Appeals is inaccurate. For example, the videotape validates the
court's statement that when Scott rammed respondent's vehicle it was not
threatening any other vehicles or pedestrians. (Undoubtedly Scott waited
for the road to be clear before executing his maneuver.)"8 6 Justice Scalia
cannot help but add his own interpretation to these facts in the paren-
thetical comment at the end, however, heightening the plausibility of his
interpretation with the adverbial embellish "undoubtedly."87
81 Id. at 379-80. 83 Id. at 379.
82 Ironically, this is all the more true because Justice Scalia, 84 Id.
in turning to the videotape as being self-evident to any 85 Id.
viewer and proving the veracity of his story, must of course
then interpret and narrate what he sees in the videotape in 86 Id. at 380 n. 7 (citations omitted).
order to demonstrate how it "tells" a story that supports his 87 Id.
own story.
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At other times, rather than acknowledging the existence of certain
counter-facts, he disputes their meaning.
Justice Stevens hypothesizes that these cars "had already pulled to
the side of the road or were driving along the shoulder because they
heard the police sirens or saw the flashing lights;" so that "[a] jury could
certainly conclude that those motorists were exposed to no greater risk
than persons who take the same action in response to a speeding
ambulance." It is not our experience that ambulances and fire engines
careen down two-lane roads at 85-plus miles per hour, with an
unmarked scout car out in front of them. The risk they pose to the public
is vastly less than what respondent created here. But even if that were not
so, it would in no way lead to the conclusion that it was unreasonable to
eliminate the threat to life that respondent posed. Society accepts the
risk of speeding ambulances and fire engines in order to save life and
property; it need not (and assuredly does not) accept a similar risk posed
by a reckless motorist fleeing the police.88
Again, these comments are in a footnote. This time, Scalia appeals
externally to the reader's sense of what typically happens in a narrative
script like the one he is promoting: "It is not our experience" that
emergency vehicles commonly race down roads like this or that they
create this level of risk.89
Finally, having established his tale of what actually happened,
supported by the story that the videotape "tells;' Justice Scalia can arrive at
his legal conclusion: "The car chase that respondent initiated in this case
posed a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury to others;
no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise. Scott's attempt to terminate
the chase by forcing respondent off the road was reasonable, and Scott is
entitled to summary judgment. The Court of Appeals' decision to the
contrary is reversed.'9 0
B. "Hardly the stuff of Hollywood": the tale told by the dissent
and the lower court
Justice Stevens also identifies the central action of the story as a car
chase, but one of a very different kind. For Stevens, the car chase is not
dangerous or reckless, nor does it put citizens at risk. Rather, it is largely a
matter of high-speed driving on a rural, lightly travelled road,91 with the
sirens and flashing lights giving other drivers ample warning to pull over.92
88 Id. at 380 n. 6. 90 Id. at 386.
89 Id. 91 Id. at 389.
92 Id. at 391.
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"This is hardly the stuff of Hollywood,"93 he protests, noting that "[a] high
speed chase in a desert in Nevada is, after all, quite different from one that
travels through the heart of Las Vegas.' 9 4 Because Stevens offers his tale
after Scalia has presented the majority story, he largely takes that original
story and reframes it into a different script, one that contains an alter-
native thematic framework.
In part, because he is reframing the story rather than telling his own
story de novo, Stevens can employ a strategy of pointing out key pieces of
evidence that Scalia had omitted from his own telling. In doing so, Stevens
implicitly calls into question the internal consistency of the former story
and demonstrates the need for a different narrative script, one that accom-
modates these additional facts.95
Omitted from the Court's description of the initial speeding
violation is the fact that respondent was on a four-lane portion of
Highway 34 when the officer clocked his speed at 73 miles per hour and
initiated the chase. More significant-and contrary to the Court's
assumption that respondent's vehicle 'forceld] cars traveling in both
directions to their respective shoulders to avoid being hit'-a fact
unmentioned in the text of the opinion explains why those cars pulled
over prior to being passed by respondent. The sirens and flashing lights
on the police cars following respondent gave the same warning that a
speeding ambulance or fire engine would have provided. The 13 cars that
respondent passed on his side of the road before entering the shopping
center, and both of the cars that he passed on the right after leaving the
center, no doubt had already pulled to the side of the road or were
driving along the shoulder because they heard the police sirens or saw
the flashing lights before respondent or the police cruisers approached. 96
Here, Stevens reframes the initiating cause as belonging to the police
officer, who "initiated the chase."97 He also challenges an inference made in
the original story, that other cars were forced to the shoulder of the road
by the speeding respondent. Rather, he points out, the sirens and flashing
lights on the police cars gave other motorists notice to pull over,98 just as
the sirens and lights on other emergency vehicles would. These additional
facts add internal consistency to Stevens' version of the story and are also
consistent with his thematic framework-that the chase was not
93 Id. at 392. that key facts were omitted-and suggest a different, but
94 Id. at 389. more plausible, story.
95 In a sense, Justice Scalia seems interested in trying to tell 96 Id. at 390-91.
the "true" story. Justice Stevens, on the other hand, need 97 Id. at 390.
only challenge the plausibility of that "true" story-given 98 Id. at 391.
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dangerous.9 9 Like Scalia, however, he cannot resist drawing his own
inferences once he has established some coherence to his tale: motorists at
the shopping center had "no doubt already pulled to the side of the road"
once they heard the sirens and saw the lights (emphasis added).
In two footnotes, Stevens adds two other omitted facts that enhance
the consistency of his own tale. First, the officer who began the chase
turned on his dashboard video camera only after he had already turned on
his flashing blue lights and siren and begun the chase; that is, the initiating
cause is missing from the videotape (the police officer beginning the
chase), and we do not see how the respondent was driving before the
pursuit began. 100 And second, when the respondent was initially clocked
at 73 miles per hour, he was driving on a four-lane highway, with a grass
divider separating the oncoming lanes of traffic. 101 That is, at the
beginning of this tale, the respondent was not driving in a dangerous or
reckless manner, nor could his action be characterized that way on this
type of highway.
Stevens must also deal with the videotape and Scalia's use of it. Again,
he points out the ways in which details in the tape are not consistent with
Scalia's story, but are consistent with his own: 102 "[T]he tape actually
confirms, rather than contradicts, the lower courts' appraisal of the factual
questions at issue"103 and "the video does not reveal any incidents that
could be even remotely characterized as 'close calls.' 104 He returns again to
the sirens and flashing lights, this time using them to point out that they
would make the intersections less dangerous.
The police sirens also minimized any risk that may have arisen from
running "multiple red lights" In fact, respondent and his pursuers went
through only two intersections with stop lights and in both cases all
other vehicles in sight were stationary, presumably because they had
been warned of the approaching speeders. Incidentally, the videos do
show that the lights were red when the police cars passed through them
but, because the cameras were farther away when respondent did so and
it is difficult to discern the color of the signal at that point, it is not
entirely clear that he ran either or both of the red lights. In any event, the
99 "New pieces of evidence can be fit within the structural categories within an incident. Evidence gains coherence through
categorical connections to story elements such as the time frames, the characters, the motives, the settings, and the means"
Bennett & Feldman, supra n. 16, at 8.
100 Scott, 550 U.S. at 391 n. 3.
101 Id. at 390 n. 2.
102 Again, Justice Stevens seems to be making an argument that relies on plausibility.
103 Id. at 390.
104 Id. at 392.
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risk of harm to the stationary vehicles was minimized by the sirens, and
there is no reason to believe that respondent would have disobeyed the
signals if he were not being pursued.105
He also addresses the swerving of the respondent's car, noting that
this could be consistent with a method of passing on a two-lane road.
My colleagues on the jury saw respondent "swerve around more
than a dozen other cars;' and "force cars traveling in both directions to
their respective shoulders;' but they apparently discounted the possibility
that those cars were already out of the pursuit's path as a result of
hearing the sirens. Even if that were not so, passing a slower vehicle on a
two-lane road always involves some degree of swerving and is not espe-
cially dangerous if there are no cars coming from the opposite direction.
At no point during the chase did respondent pull into the opposite lane
other than to pass a car in front of him; he did the latter no more than
five times and, on most of those occasions, used his turn signal. On none
of these occasions was there a car traveling in the opposite direction. In
fact, at one point, when respondent found himself behind a car in his
own lane and there were cars traveling in the other direction, he slowed
and waited for the cars traveling in the other direction to pass before
overtaking the car in front of him while using his turn signal to do so.1o6
Stevens offers an alternative narrative interpretation of the swerving,
one consistent with his own narrative script. He also points out additional
facts ignored by the majority story: the petitioner pulled out only to pass,
slowed to wait for oncoming cars to pass, and used his turn signal. 107 All
these actions are internally consistent with a car chase that is not reckless
or dangerous.
Stevens also offers an alternative interpretation of the bright lights in
the videotape, again challenging a piece of the majority's story. In doing so,
he cites his own age and experience to rebuke their presumption about
what typically happens on a two-lane country road at night.
I can only conclude that my colleagues were unduly frightened by two or
three images on the tape that looked like bursts of lightning or
explosions, but were in fact merely the headlights of vehicles zooming by
in the opposite lane. Had they learned to drive when most high-speed
driving took place on two-lane roads rather than on superhighways-
when split-second judgments about the risk of passing a slow-poke in the
105 Id. at 391-92 (citations omitted). 107 Id.
106 Id. at 392 (citations omitted).
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face of oncoming traffic were routine-they might well have reacted to
the videotape more dispassionately. 08
And finally, Stevens attacks not only other facts omitted by the
majority, but also their "uninformed"'09 inference-making from those
facts.
Relying on a de novo review of a videotape of a portion of a
nighttime chase on a lightly traveled road in Georgia where no pedes-
trians or other "bystanders" were present, buttressed by uninformed
speculation about the possible consequences of discontinuing the chase,
eight of the jurors on this Court reach a verdict that differs from the
views of the judges on both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
who are surely more familiar with the hazards of driving on Georgia
roads than we are.110
He also points out in the last sentence, as he does in the quote in the
previous paragraph, that the members of the Supreme Court are
unqualified to make judgments about what typically happens on the rural
roads of Georgia, or at least are less qualified than judges from Georgia
and the Court of Appeals."'
Stevens tells a tale that is as plausible to him as it is unlikely in the
view of the majority. He does so in large part by framing his tale within a
different narrative script, then identifying pieces of evidence, omitted or
misinterpreted by the majority, that either cohere with his narrative script
or challenge the coherence of the majority's narrative script. He also
points out that his telling and that of the lower court agree: "In sum, the
factual statements by the Court of Appeals quoted by the Court were
entirely accurate. That court did not describe respondent as a 'cautious'
driver as my colleagues imply, but it did correctly conclude that there is no
evidence that he ever lost control of his vehicle."112 At the end of his
dissent, he steps away from his strong belief in his and the lower court's
story to note the disturbing fact that two stories, equally plausible to two
different groups, can exist. For Stevens, this fact demonstrates the need for
a jury to hear the case. "If two groups of judges can disagree so vehemently
about the nature of the pursuit and the circumstances surrounding that
pursuit, it seems eminently likely that a reasonable juror could disagree
with this Court's characterization of events."" For us, as I hope to have
108 Id. at 390 n. 1. 111 Id.
109 Id. at 389. 112 Id. at 392 (citations omitted).
110 Id. 113 Id. at 396.
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shown, this engaging example of dual tales offers an inside look at legal
story construction and the role of narrative coherence in the plausibility of
stories.
Ill. Conclusion
In their own article on Scott v. Harris, Professors Kahan, Hoffman,
and Braman describe the case as one in which the majority of the Court
sincerely believes that the facts in the case unambiguously speak for them-
selves.1 14 But as these authors point out, the facts in the case do not. And
the Court-in its effort to offer the facts as it saw them-presented a
partisan reading of them, the very thing it claimed it was avoiding.III In
doing so, the Court was influenced by "value-motivated cognition:' which
Kahan and his coauthors define as "the tendency of people to resolve
factual ambiguities in a manner that generates conclusions congenial to
self-defining values."116 This tendency can result in what they call
"cognitive illiberalism"117
I agree that the case is unusual in its invitation to members of the
public to see the facts for themselves,' 18 but I do not view as unusual the
manner in which the Court-both the majority and the dissent-arrived at
its versions of the facts. Both sides of the Court put the same facts into the
interpretive frameworks provided by narrative structures, structures that
offer seemingly "natural" accounts of the facts.' 19 And an important part
of what makes those narrative structures seem natural, and hence
plausible, is their coherence: externally, with narrative scripts and the
accompanying thematic frameworks; and internally, consistent among
their parts. Once the members of the Court did this, the facts-in either
telling of them-seemed obvious. In framing the facts narratively and then
relying upon the resulting plausibility of those narratives, the Scott Court
performed the most human of acts: it sought coherence. 12 0 It also did
something that happens in courtrooms every day. Scott v. Harris is
unusual primarily in the inside glimpse that it offers into this act, not for
the act itself.
The construction of narrative coherence, as a cognitive act, indis-
putably contains an ideological component.12 1 Kahan and his coauthors
see this as part of the "naive realism" of the Court in Scott v. Harris, which
114 Kahan, supra n. 3, at 904. 118 Id. at 903.
115 Id. 119 Burns, supra n. 10, at 159.
116 Id. at 903. 120 Winter, supra n. 2, at 2230.
117 Id. at 904. 121 Yovel, supra n. 28, at 148.
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exemplifies the dynamic of seeing bias in the readings of others, but not in
its own readings. 122 I like their term "naive realism,' although I would use
it a little differently. I agree that it is a human tendency to view the world
in our own way and to regard that viewing as "real:" Insofar as we are less
likely to look inside our own viewing, to examine how it works and what it
comprises, our viewing is also "naive." But the inner workings of that
viewing are not beyond our understanding, and we can be less naive about
how we construct meaning. Furthermore, in legal storytelling, we should
be less nalve, at least insofar as we are able to understand how legal story-
telling works. Narrative structures, narrative plausibility, and narrative
coherence are an important part of a fuller understanding of how we make
meaning, not only in life but in the law.
122 Kahan, supra n. 3, at 895-96.
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